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ART. 19 CISG: THE GERMAN APPROACH
TO THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT LAW: THE
DECISION OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME
COURT OF GERMANY OF
9 JANUARY 2002
Kaia Wildner
In business transactions, parties often exchange forms con-
taining general terms and conditions. The purpose of this inde-
pendent study is to analyze the treatment of the standard terms
used in international transactions governed by the CISG - the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (1980).1 In particular, the German 2 approach to
the battle of forms in international contract law, particularly
1 For information about the status of the member States, see CISG: Table of
Contracting States, http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (last vis-
ited July 22, 2008).
2 In Germany, the CISG has been transformed into national law and was
enacted as a statute on January 1, 1991. It was published in the Federal Law
Gazette. See Bekanntmachung iber das Inkrafttreten des tUbereinkommens der
Vereinten Nationen iber Vertrage iber den internationalen Warenkauf [Entry
Into Force of United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods], Jan.
1, 1991, BGB1. II 1990 at 1477.
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the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of January
9, 2002,3 is examined closely.
I. THE SCOPE OF ART. 19 CISG
The CISG addresses two major aspects of international
sales transactions: contract formation 4 and obligations of par-
ties arising from a contract. 5
The provisions on contract formation focus on the offer and
the acceptance as the essential elements of a mutual agreement
between the contracting parties. Art. 19 (1) CISG reflects the
Mirror Image Rule, 6 according to which an offer can only be ac-
cepted by a response that exactly matches the terms of the offer.
Art. 19 (1) CISG states that "a reply to an offer which purports
to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other
modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a
counter-offer."
Art. 19 (2) CISG creates an exception to the Mirror Image
Rule for a response to an offer containing additional or different
terms that do not materially alter the offer. Art. 19 (2) CISG
provides that, "a reply to an offer which purports to be an ac-
ceptance but contains additional or different terms which do not
materially alter the offer, constitutes an acceptance, unless the
offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancies
or dispatches a notice to that effect."
Thus, a response that contains additional or different terms
that materially alter the terms of the offer is not an acceptance,
but rather is a rejection and a counter-offer. 7 The material
3 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 9, 2002, Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHXI (F.R.G.), translated
in http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109gl.html (last visited July 22, 2008).
4 See Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 14-24,
Apr. 11, 1980 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671 [hereinafter "CISG"].
5 See id. at art. 30-88.
6 See Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Cross-References and Editorial
Analysis: Article 19, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edulcisg/text/cross/cross-19.html (last
visited July 22, 2008).
7 See Burghard Piltz, Standard Terms in UN-Contracts of Sale, 8 VINDOBONA
J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 233-44 (2004), available at http://25.cisg.info/content/pub-
likation.php?id=10 (last visited July 22, 2008).
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terms included in that response only become part of a contract if
the other party accepts that counter-offer.8
Art. 19 (3) identifies additional and different terms that are
considered to alter the terms of an offer materially. These in-
clude terms relating to the price, payment, quality and quantity
of the goods, the place and time of delivery, the extent of one
party's liability to the other, and the settlement of disputes.
Art. 19 CISG, however, does not expressly address situa-
tions in which parties employ general terms and conditions.9
The parties' boilerplate usually includes terms related to ele-
ments of the contract identified as material in Art. 19 (3) CISG.
Basically, each party drafts the terms of his boilerplate in his
own favor and for his benefit, with the consequence that the
parties' general terms usually conflict. The exchange of forms
containing non-matching standard terms is referred to as the
"battle of forms." 10 Despite their conflicting standard terms,
the parties involved in a battle of the forms often proceed to
perform the sales transactions. The question then arises
whether a valid contract was formed and, if so, what are its
terms.1
8 See Christine Moccia, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods and the "Battle of Forms", 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 649,
657 (1990).
9 See Peter Schlechtriem, Kollidierende Geschdftsbedingungen im interna-
tionalen Vertragsrecht [Battle of Forms in International Contract Law],in FEST-
SCHRIFT FOR ROLF HERBER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG (English translation) (Martin
Eimer trans., 1999), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlech-
triem5.html (last visited July 22, 2008).
10 E. Allan Farnsworth, Article 19, in BIANCA-BONELL COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 175, 177 (1987), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edulcisg/biblio/farnsworth-bbl9.html (last visited July 22, 2008);
Larry DiMatteo et. al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Anal-
ysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 299, 349
(2004); Perales Viscasillas, Art. 19, Cross-References and Editorial Analysis, supra
note 6; UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods, Art. 19, UN Doc. A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/19
(June 8, 2004), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/anno-art-19.html
(follow "UNCITRAL's case law digest" hyperlink) (last visited July 22, 2008).
11 Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasilllas, Battle of Forms and the Burden of
Proof An Analysis ofBGH 9 January 2002, 6 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB.
217, 217-228 (2002), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisgbiblio/per-
ales2.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
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II. CONFLICTING STANDARD TERMS - THE BATTLE OF
THE FORMS
The battle of forms is one of the most controversial issues
under the Convention. 12 There is disagreement among scholars
and commentators about how the problem presented by the bat-
tle of forms is to be solved. There is no uniform adjudication
among the member states, 13 but basically, three different views
are represented on how this should be adjudicated: One is that
a solution has to be found in domestic law; another opinion ap-
plies the Last Shot Doctrine; and a third opinion follows the
Knock Out Rule. 14
1) Domestic law
The first opinion takes the view that the CISG fails to pro-
vide an adequate solution. Since the issue concerns the validity
of the contract, an answer is to be found in the domestic law of
the parties involved, in accordance with Art. 4 (a) CISG.15
This approach is not very widespread, since the issue does
not really address the validity of a contract, but is rather a
question of contract formation. It is also rejected by most com-
mentators because applying domestic law does not contribute to
the purpose of the CISG, which is to create a uniform law. A
further argument against this opinion is that the CISG itself
provides a gap-filling mechanism. Art. 7 (2) CISG states that:
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity
with the general principles on which it is based or, in absence of
such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of
the rules of private international law.
12 Andr6 Janssen, Kollidierende Allgemeine Geschaftsbedingungen in Interna-
tionalen Kaufrecht (CISG) [Conflicting Standard Terms in International Contract
Law], 16 WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTLICHE BLATTER 453, 454 (2002).
13 See Larry A. Di Matteo et al., supra note 10, at 349-57.
14 Sasa Strmosljanin, Einbeziehung Allgemeiner Geschaftsbedingungen im
Geltungsbereich des UN-Kaufrechts, 55-56 (Hochschule ffir Wirtschaft und
Umwelt Nuirtingen-Geislingen 2005) (in German), available at http://opus.bsz-
bw.de/fhnu/volltexte/2005/310/pdf/Diplomarbeit.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
15 See Burghard Piltz, Neue Entwicklungen im UN-Kaufrecht [New Develop-
ments in the Vienna Sales Convention], NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr (NJW)
2056, 2060 (2003), available at http://www.cisg-library.org/pdf/piltz-neue
entwicklungen_2003.pdf (last visited July 22, 2008).
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Several general principles have been identified in an ab-
stract manner by courts and commentators; one of them is the
principle of party autonomy, derived from Art. 6 CISG.16
Therefore, it is necessary to check first whether there is a
general principle underlying the CISG that provides an answer
to the problem before taking recourse to the applicable domestic
law.17
2) Last Shot Doctrine
The Last Shot Doctrine addresses the problem of the battle
of forms by strictly following the rules of offer and acceptance.
A reply to an offer by a form including boilerplate with material
alterations is not an acceptance, but instead it is a rejection of
the offer and a counter-offer, Art. 19 (1) and (3) CISG. If the
other party again responds with a form containing material dif-
ferent or additional terms, the counter-offer is likewise rejected
and constitutes a new offer itself. Offers are rejected and new
counter-offers submitted back and forth, until one party finally
begins to perform. The performance is considered an accept-
ance of the last submitted counter-offer."' The idea that per-
formance constitutes acceptance of the last submitted counter-
offer is supported by Art. 18 (1) CISG which provides that "a
statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating as-
sent to an offer is an acceptance." Thus, performance by one
party is deemed to be a consent to the last submitted offer.
According to the Last Shot Doctrine, a contract is formed at
the moment one party begins to perform because performance is
considered an acceptance of the last offer. The terms of the con-
tract are the terms of the last submitted offer. This result is
responsible for the name of the doctrine. 19 The last party who
16 See Peter Huber, Some Introductory Remarks on the CISG, INTERNATION-
ALES HANDELSRECHT, June 2006, at 228-38, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.
edu/cisg/biblio/huber-07.html (last visited July 22, 2008).
17 See Moccia, supra note 8, at 662-63.
18 See Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Editorial Remarks, in Guide to Art.
19, Comparison with Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), http:l!
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisgtext/peclcompl9.html (last visited July 22, 2008); Maria
del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, "Battle of the Forms" Under the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV.
97-155 (1998).
19 See Piltz, Standard Terms in UN-Contracts of Sale, supra note 7, at 233-44.
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submits an offer, or in other words, forwards a letter containing
standard terms, fires the Last Shot, and wins the battle of
forms. Only the terms of the party who last referred to his boil-
erplate become part of the contract. The terms of the other
party are rejected and not part of the contract.
The Last Shot Doctrine does not strictly distinguish be-
tween the issue of contract formation and the issue of the terms
of the contract. Both issues are simultaneously determined by
the performance of one party. The performance is deemed an
acceptance of the last submitted offer and results in the conclu-
sion of the contract on the terms of that offer. The Last Shot
Doctrine is followed by many commentators, 20 but it is not with-
out critics. 21
a) Arguments for the Last Shot Doctrine
One argument for the Last Shot Doctrine is that it tries to
find a solution within the provisions of the CISG, by strictly fol-
lowing the rules of offer and acceptance. A response to an offer
that does not exactly match the terms of the offer is a counter-
offer according to Art. 19 (1) CISG, and performance by one
party constitutes acceptance of the last submitted counter-offer,
pursuant to Art. 18 (1) CISG. It is also argued that this doc-
trine produces uniformity and predictability concerning the ac-
tual terms of the contract, since the terms of the last offer
always become part of the contract. 22
b) Arguments against the Last Shot Doctrine
The Last Shot Doctrine has also been criticized as casuistic
and unfair. 23 The Last Shot Doctrine imposes an implied duty
20 See Perales Viscasillas, Editorial Remarks, supra note 18; Perales Viscasil-
las, "Battle of the Forms," supra note 18; Piltz, supra note 7, at 233-44.
21 See Peter Schlechtriem, Article 19, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVEN-
TION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) n. 20, (Peter Schlectriem &
Ingeborg H. Schwenzer eds., 2005); Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, CONTRACTS 71-74 (2000), available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.
edu/cisg/biblio/lool9.html (last visited July 22, 2008).
22 See Piltz, supra note 7, at 233-44.
23 See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 182-92 (1999), available at http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/hol9.html (last visited July 22, 2008); Strmosljanin, supra
note 14, at 65.
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on the offeror to object to additional or conflicting terms. The
failure to object combined with performance result in what is
deemed an implied consent to the terms of the last submitted
offer. But parties are often not even aware of the fact that their
standard terms are clashing. Therefore, the Last Shot Doctrine
imposes on the performing party an unfair burden of an implied
consent.24 Another argument against the Last Shot Doctrine is
that it is not always clear which party sent his terms last. This
leads to immense difficulties in determining the terms of the
contract. Sometimes one party or both parties' terms include a
"defensive incorporation clause" which expressly rejects the
terms of the other party and expressly excludes them from be-
coming part of the contract. In such situations, it takes much
effort to assume an implied consent to the other party's terms
from performance. 25
3) The Knock Out Rule
The Knock Out Rule approaches the battle of forms as a
gap-filling issue and finds a solution in the general principles of
the Convention, particularly in the principle of party autonomy
derived from Art. 6.26 The Knock Out Rule strictly distin-
guishes between the issue of contract formation and the terms
of the contract.27 The Knock Out Rule gives much credit to the
party's autonomy. If the parties perform, it is assumed that
both parties acted on the assumption of a valid contract. The
terms of the contract are those with which the parties substan-
tially agree. 28 The conflicting terms cancel each other out and
are replaced by the provisions of the Convention. Literally, con-
flicting terms knock each other out.29
Performance is considered as an implied agreement be-
tween the parties to conclude a contract without regard to offer
and acceptance in abrogation of Art. 19 CISG, pursuant to Art.
24 See Janssen, supra note 12, 457.
25 See Schlechtriem, supra note 21; Schlechtriem, Battle of Forms in Interna-
tional Contract Law, supra note 9, at 36-49.
26 See Strmosljanin, supra note 14, at 55-56.
27 See COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG), supra note 21, at 244-45.
28 See Strmosljanin, supra note 14, at 55-56.
29 See Pirales Viscasillas, Cross-References and Editorial Analysis: Art. 19,
supra note 6.
2008]
7
PACE INT'L L. REV.
6 CISG. The parties indicate by their conduct that they both
want a contract concluded despite the fact that there is no
agreement about all the terms of the contract, as Art. 19 CISG
requires. A mutual agreement to deviate from the provisions of
Arts. 14-24 CISG is permitted by Art. 6, and is also possible by
implication from conduct. Such implied derogation is possible
according to Art. 8 (1) CISG, which provides that conduct of a
party is to be interpreted by his subjective intent as far as the
other party knew or had reason to know about this intent.30 If
the subjective intent of a party is not identifiable, 3 1 Art. 8 (2)
CISG provides a more objective analysis, and states that, "state-
ments and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted accord-
ing to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same
kind as the other party would have had in the same
circumstances."
However, an implied exclusion of Art. 19 CISG only demon-
strates contract formation; it does not explain why the conflict-
ing terms of the parties do or do not become part of the contract.
Therefore, the performance of a contract by parties is also inter-
preted as an implied agreement not to insist on the inclusion of
the parties' standard terms, and, where the parties' terms con-
flict, to replace them with the provision of the CISG. The terms
of the contract are the terms of both parties as far as they are
common in substance. The conflicting terms, however, knock
each other out and are replaced by statutory provisions. 32
The Knock Out Rule overrides the Mirror Image Rule re-
flected in Art. 19 (1) CISG and its exception provided for in Art.
19 (2), and assumes a contract conclusion despite conflicting
material terms, but replaces them with the statutory provisions
of the CISG.
a) Arguments against the Knock Out Rule
The Knock Out Rule is also heavily criticized, first because
it deviates from Art. 19 CISG.33 Another reason for criticism is
30 See Strmosljanin, supra note 14, at 55-56.
31 See generally UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Con-
vention on the International Sale of Goods, Art. 8, UN Doc. A/CN.9/SER.C/DI-
GEST/CISG/8 (June 8, 2004), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/
digest-art-08.html (last visited July 22, 2008).
32 See Strmosljanin, supra note 14, at 68-69.
33 See Piltz, supra note 7.
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that the Knock Out Rule was rejected by the majority of the
Drafters of the Convention. In the course of drafting the Con-
vention, the Belgian delegation submitted a proposal that ad-
dressed the problem of the battle of the forms directly. That
proposal would have added a fourth paragraph to Art. 19 CISG,
stating that if parties used general conditions, any conflicting
terms in the forms would not become part of the contract. This
proposal was rejected on the grounds that the issue needed fur-
ther investigation and consideration. 34 Another argument
against the Knock Out Rule is that it conflicts with the goal of
Art. 7 CISG, which is to promote a uniform application of the
rules of the CISG.35
b) Arguments for the Knock Out Rule
The fact that the Belgian proposal was rejected does not
mean that the Knock Out Rule is an inappropriate solution.
The reason for the rejection of the proposal was the need for
further investigation and consideration of that issue. There-
fore, the rejection did not address its substantive justification.
The Knock Out Rule is in principal not excluded by the CISG
and has its foundation in its general principles, particularly in
the principle of party autonomy derived from Art. 6 CISG.36
The main argument for the Knock Out Rule is that it ren-
ders a more practical as well as a more balanced solution be-
cause it does not place one party in an unprivileged position. 37
It also makes the sometimes very difficult determination of the
last submitted offer superfluous because, for the conclusion of a
contract, there need not be an agreement about all the terms of
the contract, but only about the "essentialia negotii."
The criticism of the Knock Out Rule that it would not
render a uniform application is also not persuasive. The Knock
Out Rule leads to the result that the parties' conflicting terms
knock each other out and are replaced by the statutory provi-
sions of the CISG. It leads to the result that the provisions of
the Convention actually apply instead of the parties' terms
34 See Moccia, supra note 8, at 651.
35 See Piltz, supra note 7.
36 Id. at 233-44.
37 See Lookofsky, supra note 21.
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which deviate from the provision of the CISG. This, thus, has
the effect of a uniform application of the Convention.
III. CONSIDERATION OF GERMAN LAW, THE UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES AND THE EUROPEAN PRINCIPLES WITH REGARD
TO BATTLE OF THE FORMS
1) German law
The German Civil Code contains a similar provision to the
Mirror Image Rule reflected in Art. 19 (1) CISG. The German
Civil Code provides in § 150 (2) that an acceptance with modifi-
cations is a rejection of the offer, combined with a new offer.38
Section 151 of the German Civil Code states that an accept-
ance does not need to be communicated if communication is not
expected according to common usage. In other words, accept-
ance by conduct, especially by performance, is possible.
In its early decisions, the German Federal Supreme Court
followed the Last Shot Doctrine to resolve the problem of con-
flicting standard terms. 39 A contract was concluded by the per-
formance of the contract. The performance was considered as
an acceptance of the counter-offer, 40 including all its standard
terms.
But since the 1970s, the German Federal Supreme Court
has no longer held on to the Last Shot Doctrine, but has fol-
lowed the Knock Out Rule.4 1 The reason for giving up the Last
Shot Doctrine and adopting the Knock Out Rule was that in sit-
uations in which one or both parties used a "defensive incorpo-
ration clause," or a "general rejection clause," which expressly
rejected the other party's terms, performance of one party could
38 The German Civil Code contains in §§ 305-310 provisions concerning the
inclusion of standard terms and conditions. Those provisions concern the inclusion
against consumers, but do not address the problem of conflicting standard terms
between merchants. That issue is solved according to the general provisions on
contract formation. See Buirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], Aug. 18,
1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 195, as amended, §§ 305-10.
39 BGH, 01/19/1951, BB 1951, 456; BGH, 02/12/1952, BB 1952, 238: BGH, 03/
14/1964, NJW 1963, 1248: BGH 10/06/1971, DB 1971, 2106: BGH 09/26/1973, DB
1973, 2136.
40 The other situation in which a party prevails with his terms is in the use of
standard terms in a commercial confirmation letter, which has the effect that the
contract is formed with the content as presented in the confirmation letter, unless
the other party promptly objects.
41 See Schlechtriem, Battle of Forms, supra note 9, § I.
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not be considered as consent to the other party's standard
terms. The Court, however, decided that the parties' continu-
ous reference to their own terms and conditions despite per-
formance of the contract does not lead to a situation where one
party with his terms prevails. The Court pointed out that a "re-
jection clause" has the effect of preventing the other party's
terms from becoming part of the contract, but that such a clause
does not have the effect of imposing one party's terms upon the
other party.42
The performance of both parties is interpreted, according to
§ 154 (1) German Civil Code, as an agreement to all "essentialia
negotii," or dickered terms that the parties considered neces-
sary for a contract formation. It is assumed that a contract is
formed with all the terms the parties agreed upon. The conflict-
ing terms, however, are replaced by statutory provisions. 43
2) The UNIDROIT Principles
The UNIDROIT Principles directly address the problem of
conflicting standard terms in Art. 2.22, which provides:
Where both parties use standard terms and reach agreement
except on those terms, a contract is concluded on the basis of the
agreed terms and of any standard terms which are common in
substance unless one party clearly indicates in advance, or later
and without undue delay informs the other party, that it does not
intend to be bound by such a contract. This solution reflects the
Knock Out Rule.
3) The Principles of European Contract Law
The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) also fol-
low the Knock Out Rule for conflicting standard terms. PECL
Art. 2:209 [Conflicting General Conditions] provides in subsec-
tion (1) that "if the parties have reached agreement except that
the offer and acceptance refer to conflicting general conditions
of contract, a contract is nonetheless formed. The general con-
ditions form part of the contract to the extent that they are com-
mon in substance." Subsection (2) provides that "however, no
contract is formed if one party: (a) has indicated in advance, ex-
42 BGH NJW, 1985, 1389; BGH BB 1991, 1732.
43 See Schlechtriem, Battle of Forms, supra note 9.
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plicitly, and not by general conditions, that it does not intend to
be bound by a contract on the basis of paragraph (1); or (b) with-
out delay, informs the other party that it does not intend to be
bound by such a contract." Subsection (3) then defines general
conditions. The Principles of European Contract Law also re-
flect the Knock Out Rule.
4) Conclusion
In Germany, the problem of the battle of forms is governed
by the Knock Out Rule. However, as already stated, applying
domestic law is not an appropriate solution for controversies
that are subject to the CISG.44
The UNIDROIT Principles (1994) and the European Princi-
ples of Contract Law (1998) are both bodies of rules that deal
with international contract law.45 But they are not, as the
CISG, limited to sales contracts. Both principles provide that
they may be used to interpret or supplement international uni-
form law instruments, 46 and may provide a solution to an issue
where the applicable rules of law are silent. 47
Art. 7 (2) CISG provides that questions that are not ex-
pressly settled by the Convention are to be settled in conformity
with its general principles, or in absence of those, in conformity
with the rules of private international law.
The UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European
Contract Law were drafted after the Convention. However, both
Principles were inspired by the Vienna Convention of Sales.48
It also needs to be pointed out that the UNIDROIT as well as
the European Principles are not a "new" body of comprehensive
rules and regulations. Rather, they are a summarization of ex-
isting principles, and they are based on the principles of the
44 See Huber, supra note 16, at 229.
45 See Perales Viscasillas, "Battle of the Forms," supra note 18, at n. 20.
46 See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994),
Preamble, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/unidroit.contract.principles.1994/
doc.html (last visited July 22, 2008).
47 See Principles of European Contract Law (1998), art. 1.101(4), available at
http://www'jus.uio.no/lmeu.contract.principles. 1998/doc.html (last visited July 22,
2008).
48 See Observations on the Use of the Principles of European Contract Law as
an Aid to CISG Research, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisgtext/peclcomp.html (last
visited July 22, 2008).
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CISG. Thus, the UNIDROIT Principles as well as the PECL can
generally be used as tools, aiding in the interpretation of the
CISG.49
However, the provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles and
the PECL guide the solution of the battle of forms for contracts
subject to the CISG only if there is a gap in the CISG.
As already stated, Art. 19 CISG does not expressly address
the issue of the battle of forms. However, the issue of the battle
of forms was discussed during the course of drafting the CISG,
and it was not considered as necessary to provide a subsection
that expressly dealt with this problem. The drafters were abso-
lutely aware of the issue of conflicting terms, but considered the
existing provisions as sufficient to find a solution for the battle
of forms. 50
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that there is a gap in the
CISG with regard to the battle of forms. Rather, the provisions
of the CISG are sufficient to solve the problem of the battle of
forms.
Because there is no gap, the provisions in the UNIDROIT
Principles and the Principles of European Contract Law cannot
be used as a tool to find an appropriate solution for the battle of
forms in international sales contracts.
IV. GERMAN APPROACH TO BATTLE OF THE FORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT LAW: THE DECISION OF THE
FEDERAL SUPREME COURT OF GERMANY OF
9 JANUARY 200251
The German Federal Supreme Court recently handed down
an innovative decision on the battle of forms in international
contract law. The analysis of the German approach to the battle
of forms under the CISG primarily focuses on the decision of the
German Federal Supreme Court of January 9, 2002.
49 See Strmosljanin, supra note 14, at 55-56.
50 See Perales Viscasillas, "Battle of the Forms," supra note 18.
51 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 9, 2002.
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ], available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109gl.html.
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1) Facts
The Plaintiff (Buyer)52 traded in dairy products and was lo-
cated in the Netherlands. The Defendant (Seller)53 was a dairy
company headquartered in Germany. In the first half of 1998,
due to a number of contracts, Buyer purchased from Seller a
total of 2,557.5 tons of powdered milk. The orders were made by
phone, and their contents were subsequently put on record by
written confirmations by one or the other party.
Defendant (Seller)'s "delivery confirmations" contained in
the bottom line the following text:5 4
All sales are exclusively subject to our general terms and con-
ditions. Conflicting statutory provisions or conflicting general
terms and conditions of the buyer are explicitly rejected and are
not part of the contract.
Plaintiffs (Buyer) general terms and conditions provided in
No. 8 "samples and complaints": "Seller's liability for suffered
damages (and/or for future damages) is limited to the amount
invoiced for delivered goods, without prejudice to seller's poten-
tial obligation to refund the paid purchase price, or a part
thereof."
Seller's general terms and conditions contained clauses re-
lating to warranty and complaints, but they did not include
clauses relating to Seller's liability, or to the exclusion of the
provisions of the CISG. Buyer resold 7.5 tons of the powdered
milk to a Dutch company and 2,550 tons to an Algerian com-
pany. Seller packaged and delivered the powdered milk. Buyer
inspected the delivered powdered milk randomly, but could not
find any defects. Buyer then re-palletized the powdered milk in
the harbor of Antwerp and shipped the goods to Algeria, as far
as the powdered milk was sold to the Algerian Company.
After an Algerian subsidiary processed the powdered milk,
some of the manufactured fresh milk had a rancid taste. The
Algerian subsidiary complained to Buyer about the delivered
52 The presentation of the involved parties is simplified for this illustration.
53 The presentation of the involved parties is simplified for this illustration.
54 It can be inferred from the facts that the delivery confirmations of Seller
did not include any other terms and conditions. Apparently, Seller's prior writings/
confirmations included Seller's general standard terms and condition to which
Seller referred to in its delivery confirmations. See BGH Jan. 9, 2002, supra note
51.
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powdered milk, and Buyer informed Seller. During settlement
negotiations before the suit was filed, Seller's legal representa-
tive confirmed the variation in quality of the powdered milk and
pointed out that Seller was willing to rescind the contract.
Seller's legal representative also emphasized that the contrac-
tual relationship was subject to Seller's terms and conditions as
mentioned in the Seller's delivery confirmations.
The Dutch company also complained about the delivery of
7.5 tons because of a sour taste of the powdered milk and
claimed damages in the amount of 29.265 Dutch Florin. Buyer
compensated the Dutch company in that amount. The parties
disagreed about when the cause for the rancid taste arose, par-
ticularly whether or not it was after the passing of the risk of
loss. On September 1, 1998, Buyer filed suit against Seller
claiming damages in an amount of $189,150.36. Buyer alleged
that Seller was liable according to the CISG because Seller's
general terms and conditions did not contain an exclusion
clause with regard to the CISG. Seller initially asserted that its
standard terms abrogated the provisions of the CISG, and that
German law applied.55
After the proceedings commenced, it became clear that the
contract and the question of Seller's liability was governed by
the CISG, since Seller's terms did not include a clause that ab-
rogated the provisions of the CISG. Seller then realized that
Buyer's terms were actually more favorable to it because they
limited Seller's liability to the amount invoiced for the delivered
goods. Seller then argued that his liability was limited accord-
ing to Buyer's standard terms, but Buyer objected, and asserted
that Seller was liable according to the provisions of the CISG.
2) Procedural history
The Trial Court dismissed the claim. Buyer appealed. The
Appellate Court, after hearing an expert's opinion about the
cause of the defect,56 granted Buyer damages in an amount of
55 According to German law, the seller is only liable for damages if a certain
quality of the goods is guaranteed. The German provisions would have placed
Seller in a better legal position because they were more favorable to Seller than
the provisions of the CISG.
56 In Germany, it used to be that the Appellate Court was another trial court.
A review included the new findings of fact, and a hearing of new and old evidence
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$633,742.45 and dismissed the case with regard to the remain-
ing amount. Seller appealed and moved to dismiss the entire
claim.
3) Issue
The issue in this case was the question of the battle of
forms, particularly whether Buyer's term that limited Seller's
liability became part of the contract. 57
4) Holding
The Federal Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case to the Appellate Court for a new trial and decision.
5) Reasoning58
The Federal Supreme Court held that the provisions of the
CISG for damages were not abrogated for Buyer's claims by
Buyer's general terms and conditions, which limited Seller's lia-
bility to the amount of the purchase price of delivered goods.
The Court stated that the conflicting standard terms of
Buyer and Seller did not lead to a failure of contract formation
because of a lack of consensus, pursuant to Art. 19 (1) and (3)
CISG, and held that there was no "dissent". The Federal Su-
preme Court concluded that the parties considered the lack of
agreement between the conflicting standard terms not as essen-
tial as they indicated by performing the contract. The Court
further confirmed that the liability provisions in Buyer's gen-
eral terms that were favorable to Seller were not applicable be-
cause of Seller's general "rejection clause."
The Federal Supreme Court pointed out that there is disa-
greement between commentators about the extent to which con-
flicting standard terms become part of a contract. According to
the Knock Out Rule, which the Court described as the majority
was possible. However, the Judicial Modernization Act of 01/0112002 limited a re-
view at the Appellate Court to errors of law.
57 Another important issue in this case was the question of the passing of the
risk of loss and the burden of proof with regard to the time the defect of the pow-
dered milk arose. See BGH Jan. 9, 2002, supra note 51. This paper, however, only
addresses the issue of the battle of forms and is not concerned with the issue of the
burden of proof.
58 The illustration of the Court's reasoning is not the official UNCITRAL
translation.
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opinion, conflicting standard terms only become part of a con-
tract as far as they are common in substance; the remaining
terms are replaced by statutory provisions.
The Court held that the decision whether or not there is
inconsistency between standard terms that prevents the terms
from becoming part of the contract does not depend upon a com-
parison of single terms, but upon a consideration of all relevant
terms and conditions. The limited "rejection clause" in Seller's
terms could not alone be compared with Buyer's term that lim-
ited Seller's liability.
The Court further stated that it cannot be assumed that
Buyer intended its balanced standard terms, as far as they are
unfavorable compared to the statutory terms, to be used against
Buyer, but not to be allowed to make use of the terms favorable
to Buyer. On the other hand, the Court continued, it is obvious
that Seller did not want any unfavorable clauses in Buyer's
standard terms to be used against Seller.
The Court then addressed the Last Shot Doctrine, which
the Court referred to as the alternative opinion, and concluded
that the Last Shot Doctrine leads to the same result. The Court
referred to the principle of good faith (Art. 7 (1) CISG), accord-
ing to which Seller could not assume that the question whether
or not the parties' general standard terms are in conflict could
be answered for each clause separately, with the result that
only the other party's terms that are favorable to Seller are part
of the contract. The Court pointed out that this must be true
even if Seller was the last one who referred to its terms.
V. ANALYSIS
1) The Court's ruling: Two essential statements
There are two essential statements the Federal Supreme
Court made in its decision with regard to the battle of forms.
The first one was that the parties' conflicting standard terms do
not lead to a failure of contract formation because of lack of
agreement. Both parties indicated by their performance that
they considered the lack of agreement about all the parties'
terms not essential.
The second statement of the Court was that the determina-
tion whether or not terms and conditions are in conflict is not to
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be decided by comparing single clauses, but by considering all
relevant clauses. With this statement, the Court tried to avoid
an unbalanced situation in which a party would be allowed to
pick only those terms from the opposing party's standard terms
which it found more favorable than statutory terms, while re-
jecting all terms that it found more unfavorable than the statu-
tory provisions. In other words, the Court decided that a party
must be able to use both its favorable as well as its unfavorable
terms and conditions against another party. In this case, the
Court did not allow Seller to avail itself of Buyer's clause of lim-
ited liability, because Seller expressed in its "rejection clause"
that all terms of the Buyer are rejected and subsequently that
must apply to all terms, both those that are favorable and those
that are unfavorable to Seller.
2) Assumption of a valid contract
From the facts given, it is not clear whether or not the par-
ties formed an oral contract by phone, or whether Buyer's or-
ders by phone merely were offers that were accepted by seller's
written confirmations. The role of Buyer's written confirma-
tions of the orders is also unclear. The Court only states that
orders by phone were put on record by written confirmations by
either party. The Court did not attach much importance to the
analysis of the contract formation between the parties, or
whether there was one contract, or whether there were several
contracts.
In addressing the issue of the contract formation, the Court
did not distinguish between the two competing theories, but de-
cided upfront that there was a valid contract, before turning to
the Last Shot Doctrine and the Knock Out Rule to determine
the terms of the contract.
There is no doubt that both theories, the Last Shot Doctrine
as well as the Knock Out Rule, assume a contract formation
when both parties, as in this case, perform. However, the two
competing theories not only lead to different results with regard
to the terms of the contract, they also differ in their analysis of
contract formation. The Last Shot Doctrine requires agreement
upon all terms of the contract and focuses on the terms of the
last submitted counter-offer. Performance is deemed agreement
to the terms of the last submitted counter-offer, and results in
[Vol. 20:1
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contract formation. Once a contract is formed, there are no more
conflicting terms. The Last Shot Doctrine requires identifica-
tion of the last submitted counter-offer not only for the determi-
nation of the terms of the contract, but also to analyze the
contract formation. The Knock Out Rule, however, strictly dis-
tinguishes between the issue of contract formation (which fo-
cuses on the principle of party autonomy according to Art. 6
CISG in deviation of Art. 19 CISG), and the issue of the terms of
a contract (terms of both parties as far as they are common in
substance, otherwise they are replaced by statutory provisions).
The Knock Out Rule does not require agreement about all terms
of the contract for contract formation. It is sufficient when the
parties agree upon the "dickered" terms. Thus, the analysis of
the contract formation is different according to which theory is
followed.
The Court, however, did not distinguish between the two
theories with regard to contract formation. It was essential for
the Court that according to the parties' correspondence, pow-
dered milk was delivered by Buyer and accepted by Buyer. That
conduct was sufficient for the Court to assume an agreement
between the parties upon the "essentialia negotii" or dickered
terms. The Court concluded that both parties indicated by per-
forming the contract that they considered the "dissent" of their
standard terms not as essential for the formation of the con-
tract. With this assumption the Court gives credit to the par-
ties' autonomy, as it pays respect to the parties' intention as the
masters of the contract. This reasoning of the Court is actually
an application of the principles of the Knock Out Rule, however,
without expressly referring to it.
It is not clear whether the Court in deciding the issue of the
contract formation upfront, already followed the Knock Out
Rule, or whether the Court was influenced by German domestic
law. In German domestic law, the approach to the problem of
the battle of forms conforms to the Knock Out Rule. The ques-
tion of the contract formation is answered first, before the ques-
tion of the terms of the contract is answered. The German Civil
Code provides in § 154 (1) a rule of interpretation that is re-
ferred to as "dissent," which provides that "a contract is not
formed if parties of a contract did not reach a consensus on all
terms upon which at least according to one party an agreement
2008]
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should have been reached." However, this rule of interpretation
is overridden if both parties, despite a lack of agreement, still
want to be bound by the contract. This is the assumption upon
which a valid contract is based if there are conflicting standard
terms,59 but the parties nevertheless perform.
When referring in its reasoning expressly to the "dissent" of
the conflicting standard terms which the parties did not con-
sider as an obstacle for the formation of the contract, the Court
expressly used the terminology of the German Civil Code. Thus,
the reasoning of the Court suggests applying the rule of Ger-
man Civil Code § 154 (1) and overriding it according to the par-
ties' conduct.
However, even if the Court's reasoning was influenced by
German domestic law, the fact that the question of contract for-
mation is determined independently from the question of the
terms of the contract, complies with the principles of the Knock
Out Rule, and is therefore justifiable under the CISG.
3) The Court's application of the Knock Out Rule
After clarifying the issue of contract formation upfront, the
Court then turned to the controversy of the Knock Out Rule and
the Last Shot Doctrine to determine the terms of the contract.
The Court stated that, according to the Knock Out Rule, which
the Court referred to as the majority opinion, the terms of both
parties become part of the contract as far as they are common in
substance; conflicting terms are replaced by the provisions of
the CISG. One would expect that the next step of the Court
would then be a determination of the terms in conflict. How-
ever, the Court did not directly address the question whether
the parties' terms were actually conflicting.
The parties' standard terms that were competing were the
"general rejection clause" in Seller's delivery confirmation and
Buyer's condition in No. 8 which limited Seller's liability to the
amount invoiced for delivered goods. What made this case pecu-
liar was that Buyer's standard terms were actually more
favorable to the Seller.
The Court pointed out that the decision of whether or not
terms are in conflict cannot be determined by comparing single
59 See Schlechtriem, Battle of the Forms, supra note 9, at § V.
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clauses, but that all relevant clauses must be considered. The
Court then continued to say that a party who is using a "rejec-
tion clause" should not be allowed to pick only those terms that
are more favorable, while rejecting all other terms that weaken
its legal position. With this reasoning, the Court did not answer
the question of whether the terms were in conflict. The Court
only stated that a party who is using a "rejection clause" is
barred from picking only the favorable terms of the other
party's boilerplate.
The Court also did not address the scope of a "general rejec-
tion clause," and the Court did not give an analysis of the rea-
sons why Seller's "rejection clause" had the effect that all the
terms of the other party are rejected, the unfavorable ones as
well as the favorable ones.
There are two possible readings of a party's "general rejec-
tion" or "defensive incorporation" clause. One possible reading
is that even if the boilerplate of the party using the rejection
clause is silent on a specific issue (such as seller's terms were
with regard to its liability) and the other party addresses this
issue in its terms directly, there is still a conflict between the
terms. It is assumed that the party who is using the "rejection
clause" and whose terms are otherwise silent implicitly refers to
the provisions of the CISG. If the other party's terms deviate
from the provisions of the CISG, there is a clash.60
Another possible reading is that a party's "rejection clause"
is to be interpreted as a "limited" rejection clause. The only ef-
fect of the clause should be that all unfavorable clauses are re-
jected, but that this would not affect those terms of the other
party that are more favorable than the provisions of the CISG.61
The purpose of a "rejection clause" is primarily to protect that
party from the other party's unfavorable terms, but not to ex-
clude the establishment of a better legal position.
With the statement that a party is not allowed to pick only
terms which it finds favorable, the Court implicitly rejected the
second possible reading of a "rejection clause." However, the
only reasoning given by the Court is that any other result was
not the assumed intention of the parties.
60 See Schlechtriem, Article 19, supra note 21, at 215.
61 This was the Seller's argument.
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The Court's reasoning suggests the situation of a venire
contra factum proprium.62 Venire contra factum proprium
means "non-conformity with prior conduct." A venire contra fac-
turn proprium is a special case of a violation of the good faith
principle in the German domestic law of obligations.63 The situ-
ation of a venire contra factum proprium applies within a con-
tractual relationship, and bars a party from the exercise of legal
rights if that party created a factual situation which the other
party relied upon, and also had reason to rely upon. It means
that if a party indicated his approval or disapproval with a cer-
tain situation, that party is later barred from asserting the
opposite.
Applied to this case, venire contra factum proprium means
that a party who objected to the other party's terms is not al-
lowed to argue that, despite this objection, the other party's
terms that are more favorable to him than statutory provisions
nevertheless apply. A "rejection clause" has the effect that all of
the other party's terms are rejected, and that a party using such
a clause is barred from picking only the "good ones" from the
other party's boiler plate, while rejecting the "bad ones." In
other words, a party against whom such a "rejection clause" is
used, can rely on the consequence of a complete exclusion of his
terms.
The Court does not expressly refer to the good faith princi-
ple in its reasoning while applying the Knock Out Rule. How-
ever, while applying the Last Shot Doctrine, the Court
expressly refers to the principle of good faith, and cites Art. 7 (1)
CISG. The Court states that according to the good faith princi-
ple, Seller could not assume that only the Buyer's favorable
terms remain valid. The Court used the same reasoning for the
Knock Out Rule, and that confirms the fact that the Court,
while applying the Knock Out Rule, was actually influenced by
the principle of good faith. Thus, the Court primarily based its
reasoning upon the good faith principle.
The CISG mentions the principle of good faith in Art. 7 (1),
which states that "in the interpretation of this Convention, re-
62 Wilhelm-Albrecht Achilles, Comment to the decision of the German Federal
Supreme Court of January 9, 2002, (BGH Report) 267-68, 267 (2002).
63 See Buirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, Reich-
sgesetzblatt [RGB1] 195, as amended § 242.
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gard is to be had to... the observance of good faith in interna-
tional trade." However, the Convention does not give a
definition of "good faith." The meaning and application of the
good faith principle in the CISG is probably the most controver-
sial issue under the Convention. 64
The reference to the principle of good faith in Chapter II -
General Provisions - of the CISG, and the emphasis on good
faith in international trade, lead to the conclusion that the ob-
servance of good faith only concerns the interpretation of the
Convention, but not the parties' contractual relationship. 65 But
good faith can be considered as a general principle of the Con-
vention and may influence the interpretation of the intent of the
parties, according to Art. 8 CISG. The international character of
the Convention, however, bars applying interpretations inher-
ent to domestic understandings and judicial interpretation of
good faith. 66 The fact that the Court quoted Art. 7 (1) CISG
while mentioning the good faith principle, leads to the conclu-
sion that the Court was influenced in its decision by its domes-
tic understanding of the good faith principle. Even if so, the
"result" that a rejection clause has the effect that all other
party's conflicting terms do not become part of the contract, is
consistent with the Knock Out Rule under the CISG.
The first possible reading of a party's general "rejection
clause" has the effect that if the party's boilerplate is otherwise
silent with regard to a specific issue, there is still a conflict be-
tween the terms if the other party deviates from the provisions
of the CISG.67 It is assumed that the party whose boilerplate is
silent implicitly refers to the provisions of the CISG. If the other
party's terms deviate from the provision of the CISG, no matter
if the terms are better or worse for the other party, there is a
conflict. The consequence is that the conflicting terms knock
each other out and do not become part of the contract; instead
the provisions of the CISG apply. According to this rationale, no
64 Benedict C. Sheehy, Good Faith in the CISG: The Interpretation Problems
of Article 7, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 2005-2006 153, 154 (PACE INT'L L. REV. ed., 2007).
65 See Peter Schlechtriem, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) n. 7 (Peter Schlectriem & Ingeborg
H. Schwenzer eds., 2005).
66 See id.
67 See Schlechtriem, Article 19, supra note 21, at n. 19.
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reference to the principle of good faith would have been neces-
sary. The fact that there was an inconsistency in the parties'
terms concerning Seller's liability alone led to the result that
neither of the parties' terms applied, and that they were re-
placed by the provisions of the CISG.
The Court, with its reference to the good faith principle, im-
plicitly rejected the second reading of a "rejection clause," ac-
cording to which a "rejection clause" has the effect that only the
unfavorable terms of the other party's boilerplate, but not the
more favorable ones, are rejected. The Court, however, did not
expressly adopt the first possible reading of the rejection clause
which would nevertheless have led to the same result, in a con-
sistent application of the Knock Out Rule.
It is also possible to extend this rationale. The Knock Out
Rule gives much credit to the parties' autonomy, with the par-
ties being the masters of the contract. Generally, the parties are
eligible, even after contract formation, to agree upon one party's
terms if the parties reach a mutual agreement. In this case,
however, there was no mutual agreement between the parties
about the inclusion of Buyer's terms. After the dispute arose,
the Buyer expressly objected to the application of its terms,
which favored the Seller.
The legal justification of the Knock Out Rule implies that
both parties do not insist upon the inclusion of their conflicting
terms, but are willing to replace them with the provisions of the
CISG. This means that the contract is formed on the "default"
terms provided by the CISG. If one party, after the conclusion of
the contract, wants to agree to the other party's terms, this con-
duct should be characterized as an offer to modify the existing
contract. A modification of a contract requires the other party's
agreement according to Art. 29 CISG. If the other party does
not agree, the contract is not modified.
In this case, the terms of the parties were conflicting be-
cause Seller's terms were silent concerning remedies, but
Buyer's terms deviated from the CISG remedy provisions. The
consequence was that Buyer's terms did not become part of the
contract, and the issue of Seller's liability was subject to the
provisions of the CISG. Seller's allegation that Buyer's terms
apply can be interpreted as a subsequent adoption of Buyer's
terms. However, a contract, subject to the provisions of the
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CISG, was already formed. Thus, Seller's subsequent consent to
Buyer's term was an offer to modify the existing contract. But
Buyer did not agree. Therefore, the offer to modify the contract
was not successful. The existing contract with the provisions of
the CISG remained valid.
Therefore, it can be stated that in its reasoning, the Court
in its application of the Knock Out Rule was influenced by the
German good faith principle. However, the "result" is neverthe-
less consistent with the principles of the Knock Out Rule, and is
therefore justifiable under the CISG.
4) The Court's application of the Last Shot Doctrine
After the Court's statements about the Knock Out Rule, the
Court turned to the Last Shot Doctrine and concluded that even
if the Last Shot Doctrine applied, the result would be the same.
In German judicial decisions with regard to the CISG, there
is a tendency to analyze both proposed solutions to the battle of
forms. There is no indication that commentators, or judges in
the member States favor one of the solutions. Courts are gener-
ally reluctant to adopt one of the theories. 6 Despite the Ger-
man Federal Supreme Court's reference to the Knock Out Rule
as the majority opinion, the Court tried to avoid deciding only in
favor of one theory, but also to justify its result under the Last
Shot Doctrine. However, the Court's attempt to invoke the Last
Shot Doctrine was not successful.
The Court stated that, according to the principle of good
faith (Art. 7 (1) CISG), Seller could not assume that the ques-
tion whether or not the parties' terms are in conflict could be
answered for each clause separately, with the result that only
the favorable terms for Seller would remain valid, even if Seller
was the last to refer to its terms.
The Court based this reasoning expressly on the principle
of good faith without defining and explaining the rules the Last
Shot Doctrine follows. As already stated, the good faith princi-
ple applies under German law and there is no good faith princi-
ple that is required to be observed by parties to a contractual
68 See Oberlandesgericht [OLGI [K6ln Appellate Court], May 24, 2006,
(F.R.G.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060524gl.html (last visited
July 22, 2008).
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relationship that is subject to the provisions of the CISG.69 The
same applies of course to the Court's reasoning with regard to
the Last Shot Doctrine.
But independent from the fact that German law influenced
the Court, the Court ignored the principles of the Last Shot
Doctrine. The Last Shot Doctrine strictly follows the rules of of-
fer and acceptance, and performance of one party is deemed
consent to the last submitted offer. The act of performance de-
termines the conclusion of the contract and at the same time,
also determines the terms of the contract.
The Court decided upfront that the parties concluded a con-
tract despite the fact that there were conflicting standard
terms, and applied the principles of the Knock Out Rule in de-
ciding the issue of contract formation; it thus flouted the princi-
ples of the Last Shot Doctrine. The Court referred to the
controversy of the two competing theories only with regard to
the content of the contract. However, not only the terms of the
contract, but also the analysis of contract formation is different
according to which theory is followed. This was the Court's first
strike in applying the Last Shot Doctrine.
The Court's second strike in applying the Last Shot Doc-
trine was the assumption that a determination of conflicting
terms was necessary. However, the effect of the Last Shot Doc-
trine is that only the terms of one party become part of the con-
tract. The other party's terms are rejected. That has the effect
that there are no conflicting terms in the contract. The Court
ignored this result of the Last Shot Doctrine.
Despite the Court's efforts, its statements concerning the
Last Shot Doctrine are not persuasive and not justified under
the CISG. Therefore, the criticism which the Court has received
for its decision about the Last Shot Doctrine 70 is well deserved.
5) Conclusion
There is no doubt that the decision of the Federal Supreme
Court of January 9, 2002 was influenced by the German princi-
69 See Perales Viscasillas, supra note 11, at 217-28.
70 See id.; Schlechtriem, Battle of the Forms, supra note 9, at n. 16a ; Schlech-
triem, Article 19, supra note 21, at n. 70.
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ple of good faith. It can also not be denied that the reasoning of
the decision has some weakness.
The holding of the Court, however, is nevertheless consis-
tent with the principles of the Knock Out Rule, and is therefore
justified under the CISG.
There is no agreement among commentators about the
scope of the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of
January 9, 2002. Some commentators are not sure what to do
with it;71 others say that the Court's decision was neutral with
regard to which solution prevails; 72 and others say that it was a
ground breaking decision for the Knock Out Rule as the prevail-
ing theory.73 However, it remains to be seen how the other
member States will respond to that decision 74 and how the liter-
ature will view it. In some comments, however, the German de-
cision has not received a warm welcome, and voices in favor of
the Last Shot Doctrine are still strong75.
71 See Perales Viscasillas, Battle of the Forms, supra note 11, at 2 17-28.
72 See Edoardo Ferrante, Battle of Forms and the 1980 United Nations Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), A Note on the
BGH (German Supreme Court) Decision of 9 January 2002, REVIEW DE DRIOT
UNIFORME, 975, 979 (2003-04).
73 See Ulrich Magnus, Das Un-Kaufrecht - Aktuelle Entwicklungen und
Rechtsprechungspraxis, ZEITSCHRIFT FOtR EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT (ZEuP) 533-
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VI. GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE
BATTLE OF FORMS
The decision of the German Federal Supreme Court demon-
strates that the Knock Out Rule renders a more practicable so-
lution to the problem of the battle of the forms than does the
Last Shot Doctrine because the Knock Out Rule allows consid-
eration of the question of contract formation independently
from the issue of the terms of the contract.
The situation on which the Court's decision was based is a
classic example of the fact that the parties are not always aware
of their standard terms. The Seller initially assumed that its
terms abrogated the provisions of the CISG, and the Buyer was
probably not aware that its terms actually placed the Seller in a
better legal position. Buyer's terms were probably composed a
long time ago, and were primarily meant to apply to a contrac-
tual relationship with the Buyer in the position as reseller.
Buyer did not pay attention to the fact that in the contractual
relationship with Seller, Buyer was in the position of the pur-
chaser. Parties, however, are usually merchants and not law-
yers. Merchants want to do business, and therefore, they do not
pay as much attention to boilerplates as lawyers would.
Parties usually negotiate commercial transactions. But if
they agree upon the price, the goods, the delivery, and the pay-
ment, the parties generally assume that they have "a deal,"
without regard to any general terms and conditions. That as-
sumption is exactly the one upon which the Knock Out Rule is
based, and reflects the actual handling of the situation by the
parties according to their presumptions and expectations. Many
transactions are carried out without any relevance of standard
terms and conditions. The parties' boilerplates usually only be-
come relevant if there is a breach of warranty or a breach of
contract. The parties then start to take an interest in the provi-
sions of their boilerplates, as well as to wonder about the terms
of the contract.
The solution of the Last Shot Doctrine, however, requires
an agreement between the parties about all terms of the con-
tract. This could lead to peculiar results in reality. In situations,
in which parties have a business relationship, but conclude sev-
eral contracts by exchanging forms (as in the case of the deci-
sion of the German Court, but presumably without rejection
[Vol. 20:1
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clause), each contract is concluded, at least by performance, to
the terms of the last submitted offer. This leads to the result
that several contracts between parties of a business relation-
ship are concluded with different contents, depending on the
terms of the last submitted offer. If it turns out that the quality
of the delivered goods does not meet contractual expectations,
the question of a breach of warranty would have to be answered
for each contract separately and differently. The buyer might
then be allowed to claim damages for some deliveries, but not
for others. In other words, the solution of the Last Shot Doctrine
would not allow a uniform approach to the issue of the breach of
warranty, but require addressing the issue separately for each
contract. This result is definitely not desirable. Additional diffi-
culties could arise in determining which offer was the last one
to be submitted for each contract. Hence, the necessity of a
strict analysis of contract formation, which the Last Shot Doc-
trine requires, would create many difficulties, while not provid-
ing practical solutions.
Another difficulty in applying the Last Shot Doctrine is in
situations in which one party, or both parties use a "general re-
jection clause." In those circumstances, it would require a great
deal of effort to imply consent because the "rejection clause" ex-
pressly objects to the other party's terms.
Another argument for the Knock Out Rule as the "better"
solution derives from the consideration of the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples and the European Principles. Those principles can in fact
not be used as tools in finding an appropriate solution for the
battle of forms under the CISG. However, the approach of the
UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European Contract
Law may be used as support for the existing arguments in favor
of the Knock Out Rule. Both principles address the problem of
conflicting standard terms and provide a solution conforming to
the Knock Out Rule. The fact that both principles were based on
the Vienna Sales Convention shows that the solution of the
Knock Out Rule is basically approved. The fact that both Princi-
ples expressly solve the problem of conflicting terms according
to the Knock Out Rule underlines the argument that the Knock
Out Rule indeed provides an appropriate solution.
The Knock Out Rule also promotes a uniform application of
the CISG. The fact that conflicting terms are replaced by the
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provisions of the CISG leads to an actual application of the pro-
visions of the CISG to the parties' contractual relationship. Ac-
cording to the Last Shot Doctrine, however, the terms of one
party become part of the contract. In most cases, these terms
deviate from the provisions of the CISG.
In conclusion, the Knock Out Rule has the better argu-
ments for being an appropriate solution to the battle of forms. It
not only provides a better approach to factual situations, but
also renders a more practical result than the Last Shot Doc-
trine. However, the controversy is deadlocked, and it would be
bold to assert that the problem is now solved.
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